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Abstract What challenges and opportunities has federalism held for countries like 
Germany, one of Europe’s most ‘reluctant’ states of immigration? Although the 
formal, constitutional division of powers between the German central government 
(Bund) and the federal states (Länder) has certainly shaped Germany’s response to 
immigration and integration, federalism is only one aspect of a broader, ‘semisov-
ereign’ model of governance that has dominated German state-society relations for 
decades (Katzenstein 1987). This model sees a range of decentralized state actors, 
among them constantly negotiating with a set of highly centralized societal (or 
“parapublic”) organizations, such as churches, labour and employer associations, 
leading to at best incremental policy change over the years. While some observ-
ers argue that this model will endure and likely also impair Germany’s ability to 
successfully navigate future immigration and integration challenges (Green and 
Paterson 2005), others argue that German political actors have been quite success-
ful all along in shifting “venues” to suit their policy preferences, be that “up” (to 
the intergovernmental/EU level), “down” (to the local level) or “out” (to non-state 
actors) (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). The chapter will argue that Germany’s par-
ticular version of immigration federalism has facilitated both incrementalism and 
venue shifting.
Keywords Immigration federalism • Decentralization vs. centralization • 
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8.1  Introduction
The rapid expansion of the provincial nominee programs (PNPs) in Canada and at-
tempts by an increasing number of American states to participate in determining im-
migrant rights and enforcing immigration regulations are examples of an emerging 
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trend in settler societies like the United States and Canada, where immigration mat-
ters have traditionally been the exclusive domain of the federal government. This 
trend has been referred to as “immigration federalism.” It denotes the increasing 
role of subnational actors in the governance of immigration (Spiro 2001). A number 
of scholars consider this development to be reflective of a broader shift towards a 
neoliberal, “marketized” governance of immigration that promotes subnational and 
even private actors as being better suited to ensure the economic competitiveness 
of would-be immigrants in the global “battle for brains” (Shachar 2006). This re-
alignment and “rescaling” of admission policies has been accompanied by another 
trend, namely the devolution of membership, which has seen the empowerment of 
subnational actors in the enforcement and definition of status and rights, along with 
the benefits to which noncitizens are entitled, with the goal of excluding those who 
do not fit the neoliberal logic (Varsanyi 2008).
How well does the “immigration federalism” concept travel to European societ-
ies such as Germany that have not traditionally defined themselves as countries of 
immigration? Is the marketization of immigration policy happening (and becoming 
problematic) there as well? And does it express itself there in the same way, namely 
through the rescaling and devolution of admission and membership? As this chapter 
will show, at first glance, Germany, one of Europe’s largest immigrant societies, 
appears to be an outlier or a “very different” case. Three differences in particular 
stand out. First, subnational actors have played a prominent role in the governance 
of German immigration matters early on, ranging from enforcement to integration. 
Second, no formal devolution in the role of subnational actors seems to have taken 
place. Still, a number of shifts can be observed. Overall, we can observe a centrali-
zation trend.
This chapter argues that it is precisely the deliberate shifting of policy-making 
levels that is indicative of the efforts of nation-states to continuously adapt and 
reconstitute themselves in the age of neoliberalism. In short, both devolution and 
centralization are but two sides of the same phenomenon. As Guiraudon explains, 
since the beginning of the 1980s, European governments have deliberately used 
a wide array of actors to overcome growing domestic judicial obstacles and in-
ternational human rights norms to remain in control of who enters, remains and 
belongs (Guiraudon 2000) by shifting “venues”—either “up” to intergovernmen-
tal fora, “down” to local authorities or “out” to private actors such as air carri-
ers. As Varsanyi concludes, “the neoliberal…state is not less powerful as much as 
it…organizes and rationalizes its interventions in different ways” (Varsanyi 2008, 
pp. 881–882).
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts. The first begins by 
discussing the general workings of German federalism. It highlights four factors 
that illustrate a general tendency towards coordination, joint decision making and 
power sharing that go much deeper than is common in (for instance) the US mod-
el (Scharpf 1988, p. 243): the significance of the Bundesrat, the implementation 
power of the Länder, the fiscal set-up and the limited options for acting alone. 
The subsequent section shows that all of these factors also shape the “multi-level” 
governance of immigration matters and that, in fact, the substantial involvement of 
subnational actors in the governance of immigration matters is a reflection of (and 
at times, a struggle with) this larger federal logic.
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The section opens with a brief review of Germany’s population make-up, out-
lines its three migratory “waves” and then continues with a historical (albeit select) 
examination of labour migration and family reunification, asylum, enforcement and 
integration. In the areas of asylum and enforcement, deliberate shifts of responsibil-
ity between different levels of government took place in the mid 1970s and 1990s 
respectively with the goal of deterring and excluding noncitizens. In the area of la-
bour migration, Germany was a pioneer of the marketization of immigrants through 
the employment of a guest worker scheme from the 1950s to 1973. Here, the con-
stant federal-state level struggle over the setting of limits on residency permits and 
family reunification illustrates the deep involvement and discretion of subnational 
actors in defining questions of belonging and right to stay early on.
In contrast, integration policy was largely left to the subnational level until the 
late 1990s. First local experiments took place in the absence of any acceptance of 
permanent immigration at the federal level. However, more recently, labour migra-
tion and integration have been strongly centralized beginning with the reform of 
Germany’s citizenship law ( Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz) in 1999 and the passing of 
the Migration Act ( Zuwanderungsgesetz) in 2005. Residency categories and natu-
ralization procedures have been simplified and subnational discretion reduced. At 
the same time, the federal level has asserted itself in the area of integration by pass-
ing new regulations and by similarly reducing discretion at the subnational level. 
Although many of these measures were passed in consultation with the subnational 
level, they—together with the steady stream of EU regulations concerning migra-
tion—all add up to a recent, centralization trend. In the conclusion, I briefly sum up 
the findings regarding the compatibility of the German case with the general trend 
outlined above.
The chapter uses historic analysis throughout to isolate and contrast different 
phases and important turning points (Pierson 2004). This approach is also help-
ful for comparative purposes as it underlines the constructed and fluctuating na-
ture of federal power over immigration across federations. As Neuman’s work has 
shown, the solidification of the US federal government’s power over immigration 
and naturalization only took place after a decade during which the American states 
controlled significant aspects of immigration policy (Neuman 1996). The analysis 
of the German cases presented here spans the 1950s to the present. Important his-
torical markers include the 1973 oil crisis (which ended Germany’s guest worker 
programs), reunification in 1989 and Germany’s first migration act in 2005.
8.2  Federalism, Semi-Sovereignty and Multi-level 
Governance in Germany
While Germany’s postwar immigration history has been frequently analyzed, the 
role of subnational actors—the German states ( Länder) and the over 2,000 cities and 
11,000 municipalities ( Gemeinden) (Thränhardt 2001, p. 26)—has been less fre-
quently studied. Formally, immigration matters are federal jurisdiction (Art. 73, para 
1, no. 3 GG), while all residency matters of “aliens” or foreigners and issues concern-
ing refugees are areas of “concurrent” jurisdiction (Art. 74, para 1 no. 4 and 6 GG) 
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that are shared between the federal and state levels. The local level is not mentioned, 
although its independence is constitutionally protected (Art. 28 no. 2 GG).
At first glance, this division of labour makes it seem as if Germany fits the tra-
ditional US view that “immigration law” is exclusively federal jurisdiction because 
it is concerned with the admission and expulsion of aliens, which are matters at 
the heart of national sovereignty and foreign affairs, in contrast to “alienage” or 
foreigner laws (i.e. “other matters relating to their legal status”), including access to 
welfare and education—which are traditionally thought of as state-level jurisdiction 
(Motomura 1994, p. 202).1 However, the actual governance of immigration policy 
is far less clear cut and fairly consistent with the larger “unitary” German federal-
ism, which grants subnational actors an important role in federal decision-making. 
It is this model we need to examine next before we can turn to the governance of 
immigration in more detail.
Although most observers would note that Germany has a long history of federal-
ism, the contemporary model of German federalism laid out in the 1949 Basic Law 
was selected as a way to curb the power of the then highly centralized post-Nazi 
state (Erk 2008, p. 58). Thus, the initial post-war constitution envisioned a fairly 
decentralized federation with clear jurisdictional demarcations for federal versus 
Länder governments. However, over time, Germany—largely with the help of the 
Constitutional Court, a set of national policies for officially state-level competences, 
and a financial system that fosters dependence on the Bund (the federal level)—has 
developed strong centralizing tendencies and gradually evolved into a prime model 
of what some call “unitary” federalism (Gunlicks 2003, pp. 68–69)—so much so 
that a recent OECD report called on the federal government to more actively foster 
greater competition among states (Bendel and Sturm 2010, p. 175).2 A more fitting 
term perhaps is “interlocking” federalism. It highlights the fact that the institutional 
set-up of the system fosters such complex and multiple linkages between political 
actors at all levels of government, that one cannot effectively function without the 
participation of the others, to the extent that actors are frequently in a “joint deci-
sion making trap,” which leads them to avoid confrontation, wait for agreement and 
accept sub-optimal outcomes for the sake of preserving unanimity (Scharpf 1988).
German federalism is characterized by such a high degree of unanimity, coordi-
nation and joint decision making that it is indeed difficult to find policy areas that 
are untouched by federal-state “harmonization” efforts, even those that are exclu-
sive Land jurisdiction, such as education and culture. Despite recent federalism 
reforms in 2006 and 2009 that were aimed at clarifying jurisdictional and financial 
responsibilities, this fundamental pattern of decision-making has not changed.
What are the reasons for the high degree of cooperation in the German federa-
tion?
1 As Motomura rightly notes, this legal division is in fact an artificial one that blurs the strong 
functional overlap between the two categories and their real, interlocking public policy conse-
quences (Motomura 1994).
2 The Länder have certainly taken the OECD up on the recommendation and now maintain sepa-
rate representations in Brussels.
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First, Germany—a parliamentary republic with a President as the largely cer-
emonial head of state—allows for a substantial degree of state-level involvement 
in federal policy making. While the Bundestag is Germany’s primary legislative 
venue, as well as the seat of the roughly 598 nationally elected members of parlia-
ment (who also elect the Chancellor, or head of government), the Bundesrat, Ger-
many’s second constitutional chamber, is an assembly of the states. It is primarily 
responsible for reviewing federal bills and regulations, although it can also intro-
duce bills of its own. The Länder are represented in the Bundesrat by their Premier 
( Minister Präsident), and a number of ministers. However, all representatives from 
a given state have to vote unanimously. Voting power is assigned according to the 
size of a state’s population, ranging from 3 to 6 votes (Art. 51 GG). States have 
a formal say over federal legislation if the bill in question is a matter of shared 
jurisdiction (“consent bills”; which represent circa 50 percent of all bills) or if it 
would impose significant costs on an individual state. States can also veto other 
laws not directly affecting them, although a majority of the Bundestag may subse-
quently overturn their veto. Until reunification, voting blocks in the Bundesrat used 
to mirror the typical federal government-opposition pattern and frequently lead to 
deadlocks, requiring resolution through a joint mediation committee (Art. 53 a GG) 
(Oeter 2006, p. 145). However since reunification, the pattern has been much less 
clear-cut. Knowing how to navigate within this environment is important, since the 
federal government’s ability to pass legislation and pursue its policy agenda is sig-
nificantly influenced by the number of “veto players” in a given institutional setting 
(Tsebelis 1995). As we will see in the next section, the Bundesrat certainly became 
an important venue for a number of immigration initiatives.
The second reason for the high degree of cooperation is that the implementation 
(i.e. execution and administration) of any federal law is formally handled by the 
Länder (Art. 30 and 83 GG). Naturally, the Länder also administer state-exclusive 
laws. Although there are many avenues of federal involvement and control, this 
division of labour has traditionally left the German states with a wide scope of dis-
cretion and power beyond mere procedural interpretation. Furthermore, formal and 
informal cooperation between states at the intergovernmental level is the norm. A 
frequently cited reason for this extensive coordination is a commitment to uphold 
“similar living conditions” in all states (Benz 2000, p. 24). Depending on the issue, 
states may ratify formal agreements or contracts with one another. They may also 
meet ad hoc or at regular intervals at conferences or in commissions. For instance, 
all state prime ministers get together regularly. Similar events may involve certain 
types of ministries only. Frequently, though not always, federal counterparts are 
included. An important example of the latter that has been very influential regard-
ing migration is the standing conference of the Ministers of the Interior ( Innenmin-
isterkonferenz, IMK),3 which has been meeting at least twice a year since 1954. 
The rise of the IMK to perhaps one of the most important decision making bodies 
in immigration is particularly noteworthy, as it underlines the upwards shifting of 
responsibility to the intergovernmental level.
3 See: http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_051/nn_8758/DE/gremienkonf/fachministerkonf/imk/imk-node.
html.
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Third, Länder powers are tempered by the fiscal reality of German federalism. 
With most taxation power residing exclusively with the “federation” ( Bund), what 
little such power the Länder possess is largely exercised at the local level (Art. 105 
GG). The constitution further lays out a complex equalization system. For one, it 
designates revenues from certain taxes exclusively to the states. It also provides for 
equalization payments among the Länder and provides for further transfers from the 
federation and within each Land if necessary (Art. 106 para. 7 GG). Still, the overall 
set-up privileges the federation because states cannot have a say in financial policy-
making without forging alliances at the Bundesrat. Although they can experiment 
and innovate when implementing policy to a certain degree, they cannot experiment 
with new revenue sources, which naturally constrains their options (Gunlicks 2003, 
p. 191). These financial realities also impacted immigration negotiations in the area
of asylum, as we will see shortly.
The fourth reason for the high degree of cooperation in the German system is 
that the federal government can expand its scope of influence substantially and with 
little consent of the Länder by creating federal agencies or advisory bodies in areas 
of Länder jurisdiction. Although one such agency, the Federal Office for Migra-
tion and Refugees ( Bundesanstalt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF), certainly 
exudes a substantial degree of influence and saw its authority expanded with the 
2005 Migration Act ( Zuwanderungsgesetz), it was technically created in an area of 
concurrent jurisdiction. The Länder have fewer options for acting alone. Although 
the 2006 and 2009 federalism reforms somewhat strengthened their position, their 
overall ability to act alone is fairly limited, even for those Länder in which the is-
sue of migration is more pressing, be that for partisan political reasons or because 
of settlement patterns (Blumenthal 2012). While local governments only generate 
some of their own revenues and are ultimately financially dependent on revenue 
transfers from their respective Land, they have made full use of their policy ma-
noeuvring room, leading the way when it comes to immigrant integration, although 
not always to the benefit of migrants.
So, how can changes within this type of federal system occur? In other words 
what are possible mechanisms towards devolution or centralization? As Blumenthal 
notes (Blumenthal 2012), the first involves a formal change to the division of pow-
ers as laid out in the Basic Law. This requires a constitutional amendment, which 
is only possible with the consent of 2/3 of the Länder. The most recent examples 
are the 2006 and 2009 federalism reforms; however they only affected migration 
tangentially. The second entails the tightening (or expansion) of the scope of discre-
tion built into one of the federal laws, which the Länder are tasked to implement. 
While a tightening would have to be mandated in federal legislation, an expansion 
can occur quite simply through Länder-specific interpretation or the increased use 
of intergovernmental fora. As we will see in the next section, this has been the most 
frequent mode of change in German immigration federalism. However, whether 
this constitutes “devolution” is another question. This would imply a more per-
manent shift of responsibility from the central to the subnational level. Here, it is 
merely the Länder making use of what they were already granted. Moreover, as 
already mentioned, we can observe an increasing tendency towards centralizing 
lately. Upon closer inspection, we will see that this in fact an oscillating develop-
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ment, which shows that we need to analyze these changes over time, i.e. by identify-
ing distinct phases.
The interaction and coordination of federal and subnational actors in Germany 
takes place within a larger model of governance at the national and EU level. Brief-
ly, in the national, “semi-sovereign” model, a range of decentralized yet power-
ful state actors, ranging from the Länder to the Chancellor and the Constitutional 
Court, constantly negotiate with a set of highly centralized societal (or “parapub-
lic”) organizations, such as churches, labour and employer associations, leading to, 
at best, incremental policy change over the years (Katzenstein 1987). This national 
model, as Green has shown, explains the overall incremental nature of migration 
policy making in Germany very well (Green 2004).
While this general model emphasizes the internal constraints affecting policy 
making within Germany, immigration regulation in Germany also needs to be un-
derstood with external constraints in mind, in particular, with respect to the ever-
growing significance of the European Union (EU). EU integration has created a 
complex system of “multi-level governance,” with additional rules, layers and net-
works that political actors must navigate to achieve their policy preferences (Marks 
et al. 1996). The term “multi-level governance” underlines that no single actor has 
the power to dominate the agenda. Conflicts are resolved through coordination and 
negotiation. Unlike the traditional German system, however, the EU system is less 
likely to result in stalemates (Benz 2000, p. 21). In the area of migration, EU regu-
lations are slowly beginning to affect everything from the minimum standards of 
reception conditions for asylum seekers to the entry and residence of highly quali-
fied workers.4
All in all, while federalism partly explains Germany’s regulatory response to 
migration, it is embedded in a broader, ‘semi-sovereign,’ multi-level model of gov-
ernance that has dominated German politics for decades (Katzenstein 1987). It is 
this model, increasingly together with EU policy, that more fully explains the regu-
lation of migration in Germany. Although I am unable to fully explore these general 
models in more detail here, recognizing their impact on Germany’s immigration 
federalism is critical for developing theories that could apply across federations. 
The next section begins by briefly describing Germany’s population make-up and 
its three migratory “waves” and is followed by the analysis of the four central as-
pects of immigration policy mentioned earlier: labour migration, asylum, enforce-
ment and integration.
8.3 Germany: A Reluctant Immigration Nation
Germany, with 81.8 million inhabitants, is the most populous state in the European 
Union. Despite its past policy of not considering itself a country of immigration, 
it now possesses one of Europe’s largest migrant communities. Its territory is di-
4 The two examples are: Council Directive 2009/9/EC, January 27, 2003 (“Minimum Standards 
Directive”), Council Directive 2009/50/EC, May 25, 2009 (“EU Blue Card Directive”).
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vided into 16 Länder, 5 of which joined with reunification in 1989. For historic 
reasons, 3 out of the 16 are “city states”—Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen. Roughly 
15.7 million, or 19.3 % of the population, have a “migration background.” This 
includes all those who have either migrated to Germany themselves or who are sec-
ond and third generation descendants, regardless of citizenship status. The largest 
(non-EU) group is of Turkish background, followed by Russian, Polish and Italian 
(Bundesamt 2012).
Only a small percentage of migrants (under 5 %) live in the former East—most 
live in the more populous Western states, North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria and 
Baden-Württemberg (ranging from 10 to over 25 %). Germany’s migrants are fur-
ther predominantly urban, with 80 % living in cities larger than 100,000 inhabit-
ants. The largest German cities (Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne and Frankfurt; 
all over 600,000) have attracted significantly more migrants than the mid-size and 
smaller municipalities, ranging from almost 30 % in Frankfurt to 10 % in Essen 
(Schmitter Heisler 2008, p. 238). As we will see, cities and local governments have 
increasingly taken the lead when it comes to integration.
Migration to Germany occurred in three “waves” (Hansen 1999, p. 417). The first 
spanned the 1950s and 1960s, Germany’s postwar economic boom decades, which 
created such a demand for workers that Germany concluded a number of “guest 
worker” agreements with Mediterranean countries, ranging from Italy (1955) and 
Turkey (1961) to Yugoslavia (1968). The 1973 oil crisis slowed down the dramatic 
economic growth and lead to a formal stop in such recruitment—not just in Ger-
many but in other EU countries that had similar labour agreements, such as France, 
Switzerland and the Netherlands (Messina 2007). The next wave occurred during 
the 1970s and 80s and consisted largely of family reunification despite the German 
government’s attempts to discourage the practice and instead encourage repatriation 
(or “rotation”). The third wave, peaking during the 1980s and 1990s, consisted of 
asylum seekers, who—fuelled by numerous civil wars—entered Germany relying 
on a unique, asylum provision in the German constitution (Art. 16 GG)—which was 
not amended until 1993, making Germany (one of) the top EU refugee-receiving 
countries at the time.5 Moreover, based on Art. 116 GG, individuals (largely from 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) able to demonstrate German “eth-
nic” origin either as “expellees” ( Vertriebene) or as “re-settlers” ( Aussiedler), have 
entered Germany in large numbers throughout the postwar era, peaking at an un-
precedented 400,000 in 1990. Since 2000, their intake has been limited to 100,000 
annually and since 2005, resettlement further requires evidence of basic German 
language proficiency. More recently, Germany has seen a moderate influx of mi-
grants, largely through changes in EU regulations.
5 See http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c4d6.html for historical data.
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8.4. Labour Migration
Although it was the federal government, albeit in consultation with major industry, 
that formally concluded the well-known “guest worker” treaties in the 1950s and 
1960s, this power to admit—which is often considered the most important in immi-
gration matters—diminished in significance once the federal government decided 
to formally end guest worker recruitment with the 1973 oil crisis. At the same time, 
Länder prominence rose because the (federal) 1965 Foreigner Act ( Ausländerge-
setz, AuslG)—which was fundamentally revised in 1990 and replaced by the 2005 
Residency Act ( AufenthaltsG)—contained only broad guidelines and assigned al-
most complete discretion to the states when it came to the issuing (and denying) of 
residency permits to foreign nationals. This was not unusual but rather in keeping 
with the constitutional principle that regulating the status of foreigners is a “shared 
responsibility.” However, it underlines that in Germany, experiments with the mar-
ketization of immigrants took place early on and that in this early, post-war period, 
subnational actors were already substantially involved in defining (and limiting) 
membership. As we will see later, this principle of shared responsibility has granted 
states an equally wide scope of discretion in enforcement matters, such as deporta-
tion and detention.
As Green points out, prior to 1965, the discretion of state officials was fairly lim-
ited in that a residency permit had to be granted to a foreigner once their “worthi-
ness” to reside in Germany had been established. The 1965 AuslG shifted the power 
to grant such permits to local officials by decreeing that residency permits could 
be issued if the presence of the foreigner did not contravene the “interests of the 
state.” The latter was left completely undefined in federal law—even in secondary 
regulations. Moreover, initially federal legislation did not impose any time limita-
tions on residency permits and most importantly, made no mention of a process for 
family reunification. What early regulations did make clear was that permits were 
to be granted only for a limited period of time (e.g. initially 1 year) and that they 
should be denied if there were any doubts regarding alignment of the would-be im-
migrant with the state’s interests. These guidelines were in keeping with Germany’s 
restrictive, federal naturalization laws and its initial “not a country of immigration” 
position (Green 2004). However, they were not followed and subsequently engen-
dered a federal-subnational “conversation” about the limits of membership and in 
particular, the right to stay.
The local level grew in importance because the actual issuing (and denying) 
of residency permits occurs in “foreigner” offices ( Ausländer Amt or Ausländer 
Behörde) located at the municipal level. Although they follow Länder-wide regula-
tions, the individual officers are the ones tasked with interpreting these regulations. 
Not surprisingly, studies found a wide variety of permit granting practices across 
the country. Although some have argued that past practice largely followed partisan 
lines (i.e. more restrictionist in the more conservative states in the South) (Joppke 
1999), others have shown that there is a considerable degree of variation between 
larger cities and smaller municipalities even in conservative states, like Bavaria, 
casting some doubt on the generalizability of this finding (Ireland 2004).
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While the role of the subnational level in the issuing of residency permits—
however discretionary and restrictive—is part of their traditional constitutional 
mandate of policy implementation, what is perhaps more surprising is that states 
have also been prominently involved in policy making at the federal level. Recall 
that their participation may occur through the larger “interlocking” framework of 
German federalism, which grants a significant role (though not necessarily power 
and success) to states in federal policymaking, both formally through the Bundesrat 
and informally through intergovernmentalism. For states to successfully influence 
federal policymaking, they need to either form coalitions with one another or co-
operate with an influential federal actor, such as the Ministry of the Interior. As the 
following, well-known examples show, while the federal government’s past policy 
making style with respect to foreigners has usually been characterized as reactive 
and incremental, the Länder have been much more willing to go out on a limb by 
pushing forward with their own policy initiatives. These initiatives have often been 
restrictive in nature.
A rotation of workers was critical to Germany’s guest worker programs prior 
to the 1973 recruitment stop but, as was widely documented, this was never real-
ized. For one, the federal government was reluctant to enforce rotations. As already 
mentioned, it was initially equally unwilling to legislate time limits for residency 
permits. Therefore, workers—with the backing of employers and home countries—
often stayed longer than initially envisaged and also brought their families. For 
instance, a 1964 revision to the recruitment agreement with Turkey lacked both 
a maximum stay and a prohibition to family reunification (Triadafilopoulos and 
Schönwälder 2006, p. 8). Thus, de facto settlement was occurring and the commit-
ment to marketization was slipping.
It was ultimately the states that repeatedly pushed for instituting and enforcing 
limits on residency permits and family reunification, which (so was the thinking 
at the time) would encourage rotation and affirm Germany’s policy of not being a 
country of immigration. Their first effort occurred in 1965, at the same time as the 
new Foreigner Act was finally passed. The standing conference of the Ministers of 
the Interior ( Innenministerkonferenz, IMK),6 which includes the federal Minister, 
released a draft set of “foreigner policy principles” consisting, among other things, 
of a strict, 3-year limit on residency permits (Schönwälder 2003, p. 130). As part 
of a grand political compromise, this particular limitation was eventually dropped. 
However, a subsequent, Bavarian-lead initiative in 1969 successfully instituted a 
policy that would limit residency permits to 5 years (Triadafilopoulos and Schön-
wälder 2006, pp. 10–11). Still, when Bavaria and Schleswig-Holstein began issuing 
deportation letters in late 1972, they faced such significant opposition that the fed-
eral government publicly proclaimed that “no legal instruments” would be used to 
enforce the limits imposed, effectively forgoing rotation from then on (Schönwälder 
2003, pp. 136–137).
6 See http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_051/nn_8758/DE/gremienkonf/fachministerkonf/imk/imk-node.
html.
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Imposing restrictions on family reunification had also been part of these state-
level proposals but little progress had been made. In the fall of 1981, almost a 
decade after the official 1973 recruitment stop, the CDU-ruled states unilaterally 
announced tough family reunification restrictions, which (among others) excluded 
children above the age of 16 from joining their parents in Germany and required 
that both parents reside there. They also introduced restrictions on circumstances 
under which spouses could emigrate. These restrictions came on the heels of a lot 
of “noise,” i.e. policy announcements at the federal level without subsequent legis-
lation (Green 2004, pp. 44–45). However, once the (then SPD-led) federal govern-
ment was confronted with the (CDU-lead) state-level restrictions, it unilaterally 
drafted a set of “guidelines” that mirrored the relatively tough restrictions of the 
state of Berlin, leaving other states, including Bavaria, little choice but to fall in 
line. Nevertheless, these guidelines were not binding and some variation persisted 
since some states refused to budge on certain points. That was not the end of the 
story. In 1982, a federal CDU/CSU-FDP coalition was elected. Although it took up 
the cause of reforming family reunification with a vengeance, it too did not suc-
cessfully pass any legislation until almost 10 years later, in 1990. Most analysts 
note that even then it merely codified what had already been the policy on the 
books, due, inter alia to a number of important constitutional court cases on the 
topic (Joppke 1999).
Finally, the 2005 migration act and subsequent 2009 regulations simplified the 
granting of residency permits by reducing the number of categories and the degree 
of discretion available to subnational actors. These regulations reflect a broader, 
renewed willingness at the federal level to take the lead on immigration questions, 
albeit in consultation with other political actors. They also denote a strong central-
izing tendency in this area for the first time in decades.
8.5 Asylum
At first glance, it seems that asylum policy in Germany is primarily a federal re-
sponsibility. Broad, federal legislation, beginning with the 1953 asylum regulations 
( Asylverordnung, AsylVO)—together with Germany’s constitutional asylum provi-
sion (which was restricted in 1993)—governs refugee determinations. Moreover, 
the Federal Office for Refugees, since 2005 known as the BAMF, was put in charge 
of all decisions regarding refugee status as early as 1953 and is overseen by federal 
courts. However, federal laws and regulations were only updated infrequently over 
the decades and primarily focused on establishing procedural “how to” guidelines 
instead of addressing substantive questions, effectively leaving policy development 
to the Federal Office together with the Bundesbeauftragter, the representative of the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior until 2004 as well as the federal courts (Korbmacher 
1987). More recently, federal legislation and guidelines have increased and among 
other things, brought Germany’s refugee determinations in line with that of other 
countries, for instance by accepting non-state and gender-based persecutions.
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So what is role of the states in refugee policy? And more importantly, when 
and how has this role changed? Although one might assume that the states would 
be primarily responsible for the reception and settlement of refugees (e.g. housing 
and feeding) and exercise their discretion there, it is precisely this settlement role 
that has also led to a “feedback loop,” i.e. an assertion of their influence in policy-
making at the federal level. More specifically, the financial and social pressures of 
housing refugees in local communities have served as an incentive for states to exert 
pressure on federal policy through the Bundesrat. Overall, the Länder have been a 
restrictive force in asylum policy making, although there certainly is substantial 
variation in their positions (Thränhardt 2001, pp. 20–21).
A central motivation for their involvement in federal policy making is Germany’s 
asylum dispersion policy. Incoming refugees were initially housed and processed 
in a reception facility in Bavaria. The drastic increase in refugee numbers in the 
mid 1970s eventually made the continuance of this arrangement unworkable. Since 
1974, asylum seekers have been dispersed to reception facilities across all German 
states shortly after their arrival (Boswell 2003, pp. 318–319). The number of refu-
gees per state is kept proportionate to the population in each state. Each state’s tax 
revenues are also considered when calculating the number of refugees per state. 
Within each state, refugees are then further distributed among the various cities and 
municipalities.
Under the current scheme, which was finally codified in 1982, however, states 
carry the reception costs exclusively and do not receive any further reimbursement 
from the central government. Although this kind of cost sharing is typical for Ger-
many’s federalism, it increases the financial pressure on the states, which are also 
responsible for providing social assistance. This pressure was particularly intense 
between 1978 and 1989 when the number of asylum seekers entering Germany 
rose dramatically. As a consequence, individual states, in particular Bavaria, Baden-
Württemberg and Berlin, who were receiving particularly large numbers of refugees 
from the East (Fullerton 1988), started to public campaign for a tightening of asy-
lum laws citing the intense pressure of accommodating “merely economic” refu-
gees on the public purse as a reason (Schuster 2003, pp. 199–204) To deal with the 
spiking numbers, successive federal governments passed a number of laws between 
1978 and 1988 intended to curb the number of asylum seekers by “accelerating” 
the refugee determination process. Concurrent legislation in the 1980s also reduced 
social assistance benefits to refugees and introduced a residency requirement for 
asylum seekers (in the municipality of their reception centre). Clearly, federalizing 
the reception of asylum seekers was also intended as a deterrent to refugees and as 
a mechanism to limit their membership rights (Boswell 2003, p. 319).
While all states had pressured the federal government for changes to the refugee 
determination procedures, the last bill during this period in 1987 is worth mention-
ing separately here. It was introduced in the Bundesrat by the same state “troika” 
that had publicly campaigned for tighter asylum rules a few years earlier (Schuster 
2003, p. 202). Among other things, it proposed “in kind” rather than cash payments 
for refugees, increasing the waiting period for work permits from 2 to 5 years,7 
7 Applicants from Eastern Europe had to wait only 1 year (Kanstroom 1993, p. 197).
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and expanding the category of “manifestly unfounded” claims, which came with 
(and still does) tightened appeal options and increased the likelihood of deportation 
(Fullerton 1988, pp. 67–70). Although some measures were left out in the course of 
negotiations, the core of the bill ultimately became law, underlining the influence of 
the Länder in limiting noncitizen rights.
The dispersal policy brought with it financial tensions that percolated up the 
federalism chain in the form of pressure for policy change. After reunification, it 
also raised social conflicts at the local level to new heights, in particular in the new 
German states. Violent attacks on asylum seeker reception centres in Hoyerswerda 
and Rostock but also on foreign nationals in Mölln and Solingen between 1991 and 
1993, put pressure on politicians to change policies more drastically, culminating 
in the tightening of the constitutional asylum provision in 1993. At the same time, 
a range of provisions aimed at increasing “burden“ sharing with other EU coun-
tries were introduced. The constitutional amendment necessary for these changes 
required a 2/3 majority in both houses. Hence, this “asylum compromise,” as it 
is often called, could only be reached in true German fashion, namely after wide 
reaching negotiations and compromising with other political and societal actors. 
Among the successfully bargained items were the introduction of an annual limit on 
the number of ethnic Germans allowed to relocate to Germany (200,000 in 1990 and 
100,000 in 2000), a promise to open up the definition of refugee to include those 
fleeing civil wars and a commitment to reform German citizenship and naturaliza-
tion laws (Schuster 2003). Despite recent protests, the dispersion policy remains in 
place to date. However, with the passing of the EU’s “minimal reception standards” 
directive, the EU is also making its influence known in this area.
8.6 Enforcement and “Toleration”
Immigration enforcement, which usually encompasses a range of practices from 
detention to deportation and expulsion that are aimed at an individual’s removal 
from the country, is intimately connected with the regulation of the residency status 
of foreign nationals, which is an area of shared jurisdiction. Germany’s practice 
of “tolerating” individuals whose removal orders have been temporarily stayed—
often for years—without granting them a residency permit will also be discussed 
briefly, because it is another example that illustrates the rise of the IMK to one of 
Germany’s central immigration policy making venues. These enforcement prac-
tices further highlight both the influence of Germany’s interlocking federalism on 
the governance of immigration and the ease with which a deliberate shift in policy 
venues can occur.
Enforcement practices are “constitutive of citizenship” in that they not only 
“reaffirm the legal boundaries of membership” but also showcase the state’s “raw” 
sovereign, disciplinary power (Anderson et al. 2011). Paradoxically, for a long 
time this power was of secondary importance because it came with too many, 
costly and time consuming constraints (Gibney 2008). This was reflected in de-
cades of relatively low deportation figures. However, in the mid 1990s, Germa-
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ny’s removal numbers spiked dramatically, as did those of other liberal democra-
cies (Ellermann 2009, p. 19). Although deportation can affect any foreign national 
without status, this particular “deportation turn” was caused by a drastic increase 
in the removal of rejected asylum seekers, who were targeted as a result of the 
growing securitization and politicization of “illegal” migration (Gibney 2008, 
p. 146). Over the same time, the number of asylum seekers coming to Germany
started decreasing. However, since 2000, unlike in the UK and the US, deportation 
numbers in Germany have started dropping back to 1990 levels again (Anderson 
et al. 2011, p. 551).
Responsibility for deportations and detentions has always been shared between 
the federal and the subnational level, illustrating yet again that control over the 
definition of membership in Germany was never an exclusively federal affair. Both, 
the Federal and the Länder Ministry of the Interior issue key regulations and (since 
2005) can directly issue a limited number of deportation orders.8 Deportation orders 
for rejected asylum seekers are generally issued by the BAMF but carried out by 
local foreigner offices, discussed earlier, in conjunction with the police. If a depor-
tation is carried out by air, federal police agents are in charge (since 2004, increas-
ingly in collaboration with Frontex, the EU’s border agency), while regional and 
local police officers are responsible for local arrests. Foreigner offices are further 
responsible for issuing deportation orders in other cases (e.g. for illegal or resident 
aliens convicted of a criminal offense), and if necessary, requesting detention orders 
from a local court.
Yet this discretion and local grounding has also made the foreigner offices open 
to anti-deportation campaigns by local churches, refugee councils and human rights 
activists. For instance, between 1983 and 2000, church sanctuary campaigns ( Kirch-
enasyl) resulted in roughly 70  percent of 2,500 cases being granted at least a more 
favourable legal status, if not a residency permit (Castaneda 2010, p. 252). At the 
same time as such local activism grew, state governments shifted the responsibility 
for carrying out deportations “up” from the local to the regional level (Ellermann 
2009). Baden-Württemberg led the way. In 1989, it established four regional immi-
gration authorities that took over responsibility from 120 local offices. It also reor-
ganized accountability, so that the regional offices are no longer overseen by elected 
officials (i.e. mayors) but by appointed bureaucrats, which significantly reduces 
their exposure to political influence by anti-deportation advocates. However, not 
all German states have followed Baden-Württemberg’s lead. Some, like Branden-
burg, even explicitly rejected such reorganization after testing it (Ellermann 2009, 
p. 127). While Ellermann’s study underlines the nimbleness of political and bureau-
cratic arrangements at the subnational level, it further shows that these reorganiza-
tions did not consistently follow partisan lines, suggesting that these upward and 
downward shifts are not exclusively driven by ideology but inadvertently perhaps 
by the success of mobilization efforts on the ground.
In Germany, the practice of staying deportation orders, frequently for long peri-
ods of time and often for entire groups of non-citizens, together with the granting of 
a special “tolerated” permits (“Duldung”), needs to be discussed here as well. Since 
8 In cases of “particular federal interest” or in case of a danger to national security or of terrorism 
(Par. 58 a AufenthG).
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a toleration permit is intended to be temporary, it does not come with some core 
membership rights, such as a certain welfare provisions or a work permit, although 
the latter may be granted in some circumstances. Typically, individual reasons why 
local officials may stay someone’s deportation order are illness, pregnancy or other 
evidence of “deservingness” (Castaneda 2010). Since 2009, some individuals on 
such a permit, for example young adults, who are judged “well integrated,” may be 
granted a residency permit (Par. 25a AufenthG).
The practice of merely tolerating someone, without granting them some kind of 
firm status to remain, has attracted significant political debate. More importantly 
for our purposes, with time, its function as a discretionary enforcement tool at the 
local level has almost become completely overshadowed by its significance as a 
policymaking instrument at the Länder, intergovernmental, and more recently, fed-
eral level. Specifically the IMK, along with some Länder, have repeatedly granted 
large-scale amnesties from deportation, or at least long-term exemptions, to rejected 
refugees and others without status. For instance, the IMK stayed the deportation 
orders of rejected refugees from Eastern Europe in a wholesale fashion in 1966 
(Höfling-Semnar 1995, p. 114) and has done so regularly for various groups since, 
most recently for rejected refugees from Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia. 
Interestingly, both the IMK and some Länder governments have been open to lob-
bying by employers (Schönwälder 2003), illustrating that these actors are not only 
charged with defining membership but also with adjudicating demands for labour.
While reforms in 2005 further institutionalized the policymaking aspect of the 
Duldung, by mandating that all Länder create a hardship commission for assessing 
whether someone’s deportation order should be stayed, they also removed discre-
tion from the Länder by mandating the agreement of the Federal Minister of the 
Interior to any large scale stays, leaving the Länder with significantly less politi-
cal manoeuvring room than previously. Interestingly, this change passed only after 
extensive consultation and ultimately, with consent of the Länder, in anticipation 
of a new EU regulation adopted in 2008 on the return of third country nationals 
(Blumenthal 2012).9 Still, Duldung stands out as yet another important example of 
the expanded significance of subnational control over the regulation of migration, 
rights and membership in Germany.
8.7 Cities, Local Governments and Integration
In the introduction to their 2012 annual report, the expert council on migration ( Sach-
verständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration)10 repeated a core 
message of an earlier report: “Germany has arrived in the integration society age. In-
tegration in Germany is better than its reputation” (Migration 2012, p. 7). Yet the fact 
that Germany has arrived there at all is primarily due to leadership at the subnational 
level and has occurred largely in the absence of any acceptance of the permanence 
9 This is EU Directive 2008/115, the so-called “Returns Directive.”
10 http://www.svr-migration.de/content/.
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of immigration at the federal level. As Penninx et. al. note: “As a consequence of 
non-acceptant European attitudes, immigrant integration polices at the national level 
have generally been late to develop, if they have been developed at all (Penninx et al. 
2004, p. 3).”
Given Germany’s long-standing reluctance to consider itself a country of immi-
gration, how then did the presence of migrants become a political issue at the sub-
national level and when did dealing with this “presence” turn into a commitment to 
integration (Mahnig 2004)? And what does this development tell us about shifts in 
immigration federalism? And what role do local actors exactly play in integration? 
Consulting Germany’s formal division of powers for an answer offers little help. 
Although the subnational level is exclusively responsible for culture and educa-
tion—two important areas that facilitate immigrant participation, inclusion and social 
mobility—even these two policy areas are subject to a complex web of federal co-
regulation and participation. For instance, while the hotly debated topic of religious 
instruction in schools (which is mandated in the German constitution (Art. 7(3) GG)) 
is overseen by state-level ministries in coordination with religious communities, Ger-
many’s extensive apprenticeship programs are governed by both federal and state-
level regulations. Other components of integration, ranging from social housing and 
welfare provisions to language courses and even naturalizations are equally governed 
by both federal and state-level regulations and implementation. The local level thus 
has precious little policy-making power of its own, but plays a central role in decid-
ing how and where something gets implemented and whether the growing diversity 
of German cities is taken into account when doing so, ranging from early childhood 
initiatives for non-native speakers to support for ethnic festivals and the creation of 
anti-discrimination guidelines. Noteworthy, yet still understudied, is the involvement 
of other local actors in the integration process, including local churches, businesses, 
voluntary organizations and increasingly, immigrant organizations (Mushaben 2008). 
Ultimately, the local level is the critical juncture between noncitizens and their rights.
Although the “reality” of immigration hit home sooner in the cities, there is cur-
rently no agreement on how cities and municipalities became the lead actors in Ger-
man integration politics. Scholars point to both “top-down initiatives by political 
elites, aimed at preserving their own control,” and to local crisis, such as “urban un-
rest” not to mention “closed door commitments of civil servants and judges,” as moti-
vating policymakers, albeit less so “bottom up” pressures (Mahnig 2004, pp. 17–18). 
All in all, local policies have not necessarily always been migrant friendly. Never-
theless, faced with inaction, silence and incrementalism at the national level, local 
actors have not been afraid to experiment and shown a great deal of leadership.
The cases of Berlin and Frankfurt show that partisanship at the local level played 
an important role in the basic openness of local policy makers. Under successive 
conservative governments, Berlin, one of the most frequently studied German cities 
when it comes to integration, initially pursued a very restrictive migrant policy dur-
ing the 1970s and early 1980s, that included barring migrants from living in certain 
districts and confining them to others while advocating for returns and restrictive 
admissions at the federal level (even under SPD). Although it committed itself more 
firmly to integration in the mid 1980s, it still continued to talk tough to its elector-
ate while expanding integration initiatives on the ground. Only under the red-green 
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coalition did it finally shift to framing its integration discourse in a language of 
equality and anti-discrimination (Mahnig 2004, pp. 24–25).
In Frankfurt, the city known as Germany’s financial capital, a prominent Green 
party city counselor, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, led the city to open Germany’s first ever 
“Office of multicultural affairs” ( AMKA) as one of its many administrative units 
(Aybek 2010, p. 95) in 1989. This occurred without the backing of “bigger” political 
players and was highly controversial at the time (Amt für Multikuturelle Angelegen-
heiten 2009, pp. 10–16). What made the office unique was that it gradually  expanded 
its sphere of influence and also, its budget, while acting as a central coordination unit 
for a range of integration projects. Most importantly, it was intended to facilitate a 
paradigm shift towards integration, a step that other actors in the federation were 
only reluctant to accept (Amt für Multikuturelle Angelegenheiten 2009, p. 10). To-
day, the AMKA is involved in a wide variety of projects from support for early child-
hood education to vocational training and neighbourhood conflict monitoring.11
Finally, although the granting of citizenship falls under federal jurisdiction, the 
actual overseeing of naturalizations, another core measure of integration, has always 
been a responsibility of the Länder. Naturalization used to be a rare act adminis-
tered by the local foreigner offices, because the requirements were high (minimum 
15 year residence, no dual citizenship allowed, proof of a firm “orientation towards 
Germany,” administrative fees etc.) and because the officers retained a substantial 
degree of discretion in the interpretation of the (federal) regulations (Green 2004, 
p. 40). Reforms in 2000 resulted in a flurry of state-level initiatives, and a set of
questions that were meant to guide the decision of local foreigner offices morphed 
into a “citizenship test” requirement, that was subsequently standardized and en-
shrined in federal legislation in 2008.
While the many initiatives and experiments at the local level certainly underline 
the local level’s ability, given sufficient resources and policy freedom, to serve as 
“laboratories of innovation,” they could equally prove the “steam-valve” theory, 
which views localities as relief points for bad ideas in a federal system (Provine and 
Varsanyi 2012, p. 107). Further research is needed to uncover the mechanisms and 
transferability of effective integration policy. What is clear is that national policies, 
images and institutional arrangements matter a great deal because they channel op-
portunities and provide important symbolic and actual endorsement for approaches 
to integration (Penninx et al. 2004). The German federal level has certainly begun 
to reassert and reorient itself when it comes to immigration and integration. Begin-
ning with the cautious opening of its citizenship laws in 1999 towards the ius soli 
principle (i.e. citizenship based on place of birth instead of descent), followed by 
the passing of a new Migration Act in 2005 (which included, for instance, the pub-
lication of an annual national integration plan and the mandating of integration and 
naturalization courses), it has firmly shifted the national debate towards integration 
as well. While some observers view the current German debates on integration as in 
line with a larger EU shift towards hard line “civic integrationism,” this shift comes 
after decades of denial and neglect at the federal level.
11 http://www.frankfurt.de/sixcms/detail.php?id=7017&_ffmpar[_id_inhalt]=7846492.
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8.8  Conclusion: The Janus Face of Germany’s 
Immigration Federalism 
This brief survey of Germany’s immigration federalism has shown that the particular 
federalism model in place there ultimately facilitated both the restriction and expan-
sion of non-citizen rights. Unlike in other federations, subnational actors played im-
portant roles early on in the regulation of all aspects of German migration, ranging 
from labour migration and asylum to enforcement and integration. However, their 
role in these areas expanded not because of a formal devolution of federal respon-
sibilities to the subnational level but largely because subnational actors made full 
use of their powers while the federal government dragged its feet. Still, this had the 
effect of shifting the control over membership to the subnational and the intergov-
ernmental level (i.e. to the IMK) for decades. Moreover, the high degree of policy 
initiatives and policymaking at the subnational level frequently created a “feedback 
loop” at the federal level, in that subnational activities became the basis for federal 
legislation later on, often together with “input” from the courts. Here, the gover-
nance of immigration follows the larger German logic of federalism, which is based 
on a complex web of coordination, inter-connections and joint decision-making.
The survey further suggests that we should consider conceptualizing any shifts 
in a country’s immigration federalism as “phases” rather than permanent trends. 
Germany, after all, was one of the earliest users of a classic marketization scheme 
for immigration, the guest worker programs. Although past choices can signifi-
cantly influence future decision-making, the most recent flurry of activities at the 
federal level certainly makes it clear that Germany has entered a new centralization 
phase. However, this centralization phase, as this chapter has argued, is only another 
side of a neoliberal nation-state reconstituting itself. This phase is further propelled 
by the steady increase in EU Directives, regulations, jurisprudence, working groups 
and other policy-related “output.” Although this growth in EU activities has also 
had the effect of restricting the sovereign policy choices of national governments, 
the associated regulations seems to have largely “trickled down” to the German 
subnational level in the form of policy centralization, as the implementation of the 
recent EU “Returns Directive” illustrates.
Given the nature of Germany’s “interlocking” federal system, which is further 
embedded in a larger system of multi-level “semi-sovereign” governance, this cen-
tralization phase will not mean the end of subnational activism and policy leader-
ship. In fact, it serves as a reminder of the range of “venues” available to nation 
states in this age of global migration.
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